Attacking Hypervisors Through Firmware and Hardware  [ slides slides ]

Advanced Threat Research, Intel Security
Black Hat USA 2015

In this presentation, we explore the attack surface of modern hypervisors from the perspective of vulnerabilities in system firmware, such as BIOS and in hardware emulation. We will demonstrate a number of new attacks on hypervisors based on system firmware vulnerabilities with impacts ranging from VMM DoS to hypervisor privilege escalation to SMM privilege escalation from within the virtual machines.

We will also show how a firmware rootkit based on these vulnerabilities could expose secrets within virtual machines and explain how firmware issues can be used for analysis of hypervisor-protected content such as VMCS structures, EPT tables, host physical addresses (HPA) map, IOMMU page tables etc. To enable further hypervisor security testing, we will also be releasing new modules in the open source CHIPSEC framework to test issues in hypervisors when virtualizing hardware.

Attacking and Defending BIOS in 2015  [ slides ]

Advanced Threat Research, Intel Security
RECon 2015

In this presentation we will demonstrate multiple types of recently discovered BIOS vulnerabilities. We will detail how hardware configuration is restored upon resume from sleep and how BIOS can be attacked when waking up from sleep using "S3 resume boot script" vulnerabilities. Similarly, we will discuss the impact of insufficient protection of persistent configuration data in non-volatile storage and more. We'll also describe how to extract contents of SMRAM using above vulnerabilities and advanced methods such as Graphics aperture DMA to further perform analysis of the SMM code that would otherwise be protected. Additionally, we will detail "SMI input pointer" and other new types of vulnerabilities specific to SMI handlers. Finally, we will describe how each class of issues is mitigated as a whole and introduce new modules to CHIPSEC framework to test systems for these types of issues

A New Class of Vulnerabilities in SMI Handlers  [ slides  demo ]

Advanced Threat Research, Intel Security
CanSecWest 2015

This presentation will discuss security of SMI handler components of system firmware including the nature of a new class of vulnerabilities within the SMI handlers of BIOS/UEFI based firmware on various systems. It will also discuss how systems can be tested for these vulnerabilities and what can be done in firmware implementations to mitigate them.

Additionally, the presentation will also discuss how S3 resume affects security of the system and problems with S3 resume boot script in some BIOS implementations recently discovered and presented at 31C3.

Summary of Attacks Against BIOS and Secure Boot  [ slides ] [ Demos of Secure Boot Bypass: 1  2  3 ]

Yuriy Bulygin, John Loucaides, Andrew Furtak, Oleksandr Bazhaniuk, Alexander Matrosov

A variety of attacks targeting platform firmware have been discussed publicly, drawing attention to the pre-boot and firmware components of the platform such as secure boot, OS loaders, and SMM. Windows 8 Secure Boot provides an important protection against bootkits by enforcing a signature check on each boot component.

This talk will detail and organize some of the attacks and how they work. We will demonstrate a full software bypass of secure boot. In addition, we will describe underlying vulnerabilities and how to assess systems for these issues using an open source framework for platform security assessment. We will cover BIOS write protection, forensics on platform firmware, attacks against SMM, attacks against secure boot, and various other issues. After watching, you should understand how these attacks work, how they are mitigated, and how to test a system for the vulnerability.

Platform Security Assessment With CHIPSEC  [ slides ]

John Loucaides, Yuriy Bulygin
CanSecWest 2014

All Your Boot Are Belong To Us

[ slides (Intel)  slides (MITRE)  Demo (Unprotected Secure Boot Disable)  Demo (PE/TE Header Confusion) ]

Yuriy Bulygin, Andrew Furtak, Oleksandr Bazhaniuk, John Loucaides from Intel
Corey Kallenberg, Xeno Kovah, John Butterworth, Sam Cornwell from MITRE
CanSecWest 2014

A Tale of One Software Bypass of Windows 8 Secure Boot  [ slides  demo 1  demo 2 ]

Yuriy Bulygin, Andrew Furtak, Oleksandr Bazhaniuk
Black Hat USA 2013

Windows 8 Secure Boot based on UEFI 2.3.1 Secure Boot is an important step towards securing platforms from malware compromising boot sequence before the OS. However, there are certain mistakes platform vendors shouldn't make which can completely undermine protections offered by Secure Boot. We will demonstrate an example of full software bypass of Windows 8 Secure Boot due to such mistakes on some of the latest platforms and explain how those mistakes can be avoided.

Evil Maid Just Got Angrier: Why Full-Disk Encryption With TPM is Insecure on Many Systems  [ slides  demo ]

CanSecWest 2013

Security features like Full-Disk Encryption solutions rely on protections of the underlying firmware and hardware. Often system firmware (BIOS) doesn't use or incorrectly configures protections offered by hardware. This work demonstrates that software Full-Disk Encryption solutions are still subject to Evil Maid attacks when firmware fails to correctly utilize hardware protections, even when they rely on Trusted Platform Module to protect contents on the system drive from attacks that tamper with system firmware.

Country Fair ;)

Intel Security Conference 2011

Enhanced Detection of Malware  [ paper  ]

Carlos Rozas, Hormuzd Khosravi, Divya Kolar Sunder, Yuriy Bulygin
Intel Technology Journal, Volume 13 Issue 02, 2009 (Advances in Internet Security)

Researchers and industry have found novel uses for cloud computing to detect malware. We present a cloud-computing-based architecture that improves the resiliency of the existing solutions, and we describe our prototype that is based on existing Intel platforms.

Chipset Based Detection and Removal of Virtualization Malware

Intel Virtualization Security Summit 2008

Insane Detection of Insane Rootkits: Chipset Based Detection and Removal of Virtualization Malware  [ slides demo ]

Yuriy Bulygin, David Samyde
Black Hat USA 2008

This work introduces an approach to detect hardware-assisted virtualization malware different from currently developed techniques. It uses hardware capabilities of an embedded microcontroller inside chipset's north-bridge to detect virtualization malware, and to go beyond detection and remove it from the system. We will discuss advantages and other potential applications of the approach, possible attacks evading detection and solutions.

It also includes a demo of DeepWatch, a proof of concept detector of VT-x based virtualization rootkits implemented in north-bridge firmware.

CPU side-channels vs. virtualization rootkits: the good, the bad, or the ugly  [ slides demo HYPER-CHANNEL CODE ]

ToorCon Seattle 2008

Side-channels that use CPU resources are bad. Everyone knows that. Rootkits that use CPU virtualization aren't any better. Security researchers mentioned theoretical possibility of using new developments in CPU side-channel cryptanalysis to detect virtualization rootkits. The purpose of this talk is to demonstrate actual implementation of detector that uses recently discovered RSB based micro-architectural side-channel to detect CPU virtualization rootkits. We will also describe essentials of the RSB-based side-channel analysis used by our detector.

Remote and Local Exploitation of Network Drivers  [ paper slides demo (55MB) ]

Black Hat USA 2007

During 2006 vulnerabilities in wireless LAN drivers gained an increasing attention in security community. One can explain this by the fact that any hacker can take control over every vulnerable laptop without having any "visible" connection with those laptops and execute a malicious code in kernel.

This work describes the process behind hunting remote and local vulnerabilities in wireless LAN drivers as well as in other types of network drivers. The first part of the work describes simple and much more advanced examples of remote execution vulnerabilities in wireless device drivers that should be considered during vulnerabilities search. We demonstrate an example design of kernel-mode payload and construct a simple wireless frames fuzzer. The second part of the work explains local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in I/O Control device driver interface on Microsoft® Windows®, introduces a technique to uncover them. The third part of the work describes specific examples of local vulnerabilities in network drivers that can be exploited remotely and an exploitation technique. In the last part of the work we present case studies of remote and local vulnerabilities mitigated in Intel® Centrino® wireless LAN device drivers.


Epidemics of Mobile Worms  [ paper  ]

IEEE IPCCC Malware 2007

A Spread Model of Flash Worms  [ paper  ]

IEEE IPCCC Malware 2006
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